The Plot, the Builder, and the Buildings

The dispute centres on a large plot of land in Vile Parle, admeasuring 21,736 square metres, bearing CTS No. 69/6 (PT) and CTS No. 35 of Village Vile Parle. The developer, Kiran Builders Pvt. Ltd., undertook phased construction on this land over several decades, eventually completing twelve buildings — numbered A to H, J, K, L, and M.

The flat buyers of the first ten buildings (A to H, J and K) formed Kalpita Enclave Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (Respondent No. 1). When buildings L and M were subsequently completed and their occupancy certificates issued in November 1990, their residents formed two separate societies — Kalpita Enclave Building No. L CHSL (Respondent No. 2) and Kalpita Enclave Building No. M CHSL (Respondent No. 3).

All three societies wanted what the law entitled them to: conveyance of the land on which their buildings stood.

Four Decades of Dispute

The conflict between the builder and the societies did not begin in 2017. It stretches back to 1985.

When Kiran Builders proposed constructing four additional buildings — L, M, N, and P — on the plot by utilising FSI flowing from land surrendered for a 44-feet Development Plan road, Respondent No. 1 Society was opposed. It filed S.C. Suit No. 3226 of 1985 before the City Civil Court, Bombay, seeking conveyance of the entire land of 21,736 sq. mtrs in its favour and effectively challenging the developer’s expansion plans.

During the pendency of that suit, Kiran Builders succeeded in constructing buildings L and M, which received their occupancy certificates in November 1990. The City Civil Court, taking note of this changed reality, passed a decree on November 7, 1997, directing conveyance of only the land appurtenant to buildings A to H, J and K in favour of Respondent No. 1 Society. The prayer for conveyance of the entire land was not granted.

Respondent No. 1 Society challenged this decree before the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 1091 of 2000. That appeal remained pending for sixteen years.

By 2016, the picture had changed further. Two more societies had formed in buildings L and M. Respondent No. 1 Society reconsidered its approach — rather than fighting for the entire land solely for itself and excluding the other two societies, it chose to join hands with Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and seek joint conveyance of the entire land. On September 16, 2016, Respondent No. 1 withdrew First Appeal No. 1091 of 2000, expressly stating its intention to apply for deemed conveyance. All three societies then filed a joint application under Section 11(3) of MOFA before the District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies-3, Mumbai, who also functions as the Competent Authority under MOFA.

On May 15, 2017, the Competent Authority granted a certificate of unilateral deemed conveyance of the entire land admeasuring 21,736 sq. mtrs in favour of the three societies.

Kiran Builders challenged this order before the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 9694 of 2017. The High Court admitted the petition in March 2024 and stayed the operation of the deemed conveyance order pending final hearing. The petition was finally decided on June 18, 2026.

The Three Grounds Raised by the Builder

Kiran Builders raised three principal grounds to challenge and resist the deemed conveyance order.

Ground One: The 1997 Civil Court Decree

The builder’s first argument was that the decree dated November 7, 1997 passed by the City Civil Court had attained finality — since Respondent No. 1’s First Appeal was withdrawn — and that this decree, which directed conveyance of only the land appurtenant to buildings A to H, J and K, created a binding determination that could not be overridden by the Competent Authority under MOFA. The builder contended that the Competent Authority had no jurisdiction to pass an order contrary to what the Civil Court had already decided.

The court rejected this argument. Justice Sandeep V. Marne held that the 1985 suit was filed in an entirely different context — at a time when only buildings A to H, J and K existed and Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had not yet been formed. The 1997 decree accordingly directed conveyance of only the land appurtenant to those buildings, since buildings L and M had come up during the pendency of the suit and the court had to accommodate that reality. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were not parties to the suit or to the First Appeal. A decision on land entitlement could not have been effectively rendered without hearing them.

The court held that it is always open to a party to withdraw a conveyance suit and file an application for deemed conveyance instead. Legislature had consciously provided this faster remedy under amended MOFA. Since the suit itself could have been withdrawn with liberty to seek deemed conveyance, the same course was equally available during pendency of the appeal. The objection of res judicata was also repelled since the appeal was withdrawn expressly for the purpose of filing a deemed conveyance application — not as an abandonment of the claim.

Ground Two: Reserved and Surrendered Land

The builder’s second argument was that the Competent Authority had erred in conveying the entire land of 21,736 sq. mtrs, since portions of that land had already been surrendered for a DP road or were reserved in the Development Plan for a municipal market and a primary school. These portions, the builder argued, could not legally be conveyed to the societies.

On this ground, the court agreed with the builder — but only partially, and the societies themselves conceded the point. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 voluntarily offered to exclude not just the three portions flagged by the builder, but two additional ones: land admeasuring 123.12 sq. mtrs taken over by MCGM in 2001 for widening of Sahar Road, and land admeasuring 2,328.41 sq. mtrs encroached upon by slum dwellers and lying outside the societies’ compound wall.

The total deductions worked out to 4,711.65 sq. mtrs, reducing the conveyance area to 16,584.55 sq. mtrs. The court accepted this and held that the Competent Authority had committed an error in directing conveyance of the full 21,736 sq. mtrs — an error that needed correction.

Ground Three: Future Construction of Buildings N and P

This was the builder’s most ambitious argument, and the one the court dealt with most firmly.

Kiran Builders contended that it retained the right to construct two more buildings — N and P — on the plot, on the basis of plans sanctioned in 1983. It argued that conveyance could not be granted until the entire layout development was complete, and that even the 16,584.55 sq. mtrs sought by the societies could not be conveyed since Buildings N and P would come up on that land.

The court traced the history of this claim carefully. The construction of buildings N and P was always premised on the builder’s belief that the land surrendered for the DP road measured 2,200 sq. mtrs — which would have generated sufficient FSI for four additional buildings, L, M, N, and P. However, when the actual area surrendered was determined to be only 1,859 sq. mtrs, the FSI available was reduced, allowing construction of only buildings L and M. Buildings N and P could not be built.

Critically, this was not a recent discovery. MCGM had communicated this position to Kiran Builders in a letter dated April 23, 1991 — over three decades ago — explicitly stating that there was no balance FSI in lieu of the DP road and that construction of buildings N and P was not possible.

Faced with this, the builder advanced a novel argument: that it expected to receive development rights — possibly in the form of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) — when the lands reserved for the municipal market and primary school were eventually acquired by the Municipal Corporation, and that it intended to use those rights to construct buildings N and P.

The court called this argument “preposterous to the core” and dismantled it on six grounds. First, there is no certainty that the Planning Authority will ever acquire those reserved lands — if they are not acquired within the stipulated period, the land owner can invoke Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and have the reservations lifted. Second, if the lands are acquired, the builder’s entitlement is to compensation — monetary or through TDR. Third, TDR, if issued through a Development Rights Certificate, is freely tradable and can be used in any other project or sold in the market — there is no obligation to use it on the subject land. Fourth, the builder retains ownership of the slum land, which can be independently redeveloped using any TDR received. Fifth, and as the court underlined most importantly, compensation received for acquired land — whether monetary or in TDR form — cannot be treated as a development potential for the land being conveyed to the societies. Once land is acquired, it is separated from the layout entirely. Sixth, the acquisitions have not happened yet, and cooperative of neighbouring landowners required for the process is absent — making the entire premise even more uncertain.

The court also invoked the settled legal position established by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Lakeview Developers vs. Eternia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (2015), which held that a developer cannot exploit building potential for eternity without conveying land to the society. Once the full development potential is exhausted and the obligation to convey has arisen, any future FSI or TDR that may become available cannot be used to justify withholding conveyance. This principle was reiterated in Rajkumar Gulati and Ors. vs. S.D. Corporation Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. (2025).

The Court’s Order

Justice Marne held that the Competent Authority was fully justified in exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 of MOFA and granting deemed conveyance. The petition by Kiran Builders was partly allowed — but only to the extent of correcting the area of land to be conveyed.

The order dated May 15, 2017 passed by the Competent Authority, along with the certificate of unilateral deemed conveyance issued in pursuance thereof, was set aside. The matter was remanded to the Competent Authority with a direction to issue a fresh certificate of unilateral deemed conveyance in respect of land admeasuring 16,584.55 sq. mtrs in favour of the three societies — within three months. Parties were directed to appear before the Competent Authority on June 24, 2026.

The occupancy certificates for the buildings of Respondent No. 1 Society were issued in the 1970s. Those of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 followed in November 1990. The court noted that the builder had already delayed performance of its statutory obligation for an extraordinary length of time. No costs were awarded.

Also Read: Stuck With Deemed Conveyance? Maharashtra Govt Launches Statewide 4-Day Camp for Housing Societies

The post Deemed Conveyance Cannot Be Held Hostage By Builder to Future FSI appeared first on Square Feat India.

The Case

The Upvan Woodlands CHS in Upper Govind Nagar, Malad East, was constructed on a portion of a larger five-plot layout admeasuring 4683.80 sq. mtrs. originally owned by Balrampur Chini Mills and later developed by Upvan Developers. The society’s building received its Occupation Certificate in May 2017, and the society was registered in July 2018. Despite repeated demands, the developer refused to execute conveyance, insisting — as per Clause 12 of the MOFA Agreement for Sale — that conveyance would be done only after completion of the entire layout development and sale of all flats in future buildings.

The Competent Authority (District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies) rejected the society’s application for deemed conveyance on 20 May 2025, terming it premature and relying heavily on the contractual clause and the Marathon Era judgment.

Key Legal Findings of the Court

1. Statutory Timeline Overrides Contractual Clauses The Court emphatically held that the timeline prescribed under Rule 9 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Rules, 1964 (conveyance within 4 months of society registration, or a mutually agreed fixed period) prevails over any contractual stipulation. Any clause that defers conveyance until an uncertain future event — such as completion of the entire layout — is void to that extent. The Court relied heavily on its earlier judgment in Lok Housing and Construction Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (2025).
2. Proportionate / Part Conveyance Allowed in Layouts This is the most important takeaway for societies in large phased developments. The Court ruled that societies of completed buildings are entitled to conveyance of their proportionate share of land even before the entire layout is developed. This principle is backed by the Government Resolution dated 22 June 2018 issued by the Cooperation Department.
3. Misreading of Precedents Clarified The Court clarified that the Marathon Era judgment was wrongly interpreted by the Competent Authority. It does not support the developer’s stand of waiting for full layout completion. The Court also distinguished the Apex Court’s observations in Jayantilal Investments.
4. FSI and Developer Concerns Addressed While acknowledging that FSI calculations are done on the entire layout, the Court noted that the society had restricted its claim to only 2799.90 sq. mtrs. (as mentioned in the Second Schedule of the agreements). Granting conveyance of this portion will not prevent the developer from completing construction on the remaining plots (148 & 149). The society will have no right to interfere with the balance development beyond the originally disclosed terms.

Significance for Homebuyers and Housing Societies

This judgment is a major boost for homebuyers trapped in large layout projects where developers deliberately delay conveyance to exploit additional FSI/TDR that becomes available over time. By securing ownership of their proportionate land early, societies gain:

• Marketable title and better property valuation
• Ability to undertake redevelopment independently if needed
• Stronger legal position against promoter delays

The ruling reinforces the welfare objective of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act (MOFA) and sends a clear message that private contractual clauses cannot defeat statutory protections for flat purchasers.

What Happens Next?

The Competent Authority must now issue the deemed conveyance certificate within six weeks. The developer’s request for stay on the order was rejected by the Court.

Legal experts believe this judgment, along with earlier rulings like ACME Enterprises and Lok Housing, will strengthen the hands of Competent Authorities while deciding similar applications. Societies stuck in similar situations should immediately review their agreements and file (or revive) applications for deemed conveyance.

Also Read: Conveyance Deed has to be registered within 3 months of Receiving OC

The post Major Win for Homebuyers: HC Allows Part Conveyance in Phased Layouts appeared first on Square Feat India.

The case relates to land admeasuring 906.30 sq.m. (bearing CTS Nos. 4129(pt), 4088(pt), 4090(pt), 4091(pt) and 4097(pt)) along with the structures known as “Vallabh Chawl” situated at Ramji Ashar Lane, Village Kirol, Ghatkopar (East), Mumbai. The acquisition was carried out for the public purpose of laying the 5th and 6th railway lines as part of the Central Railway’s expansion under the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP).

Chronology of Key Events

• 22 January 1998: Section 4 Notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published (relevant date for market value determination).
• 25 June 1998: Section 6 Declaration issued.
• 11 August 1998: Notices under Sections 9(3) and 9(4) issued to claimants.
• 22 December 2000: SLAO passed Award No. LAQ/382/4/Kirol, determining market value at ₹3,750 per sq.m. and awarding total compensation of approximately ₹78.69 lakh. The SLAO treated the land as a narrow elongated strip with limited development potential due to railway proximity and tenant encumbrances.
• 2003: Owner filed LAR No. 9 of 2005 seeking enhancement under Section 18.
• 14 August 2003: LAR No. 5 of 2003 filed under Section 30 for apportionment between the owner and tenants.
• 2005: MMRDA provided permanent alternate accommodation to all 12 tenants. Tenants executed undertakings agreeing to transfer their compensation share to MMRDA. Possession of the acquired property was handed over on 4 September 2005.

Court’s Ruling on Compensation Enhancement (LAR No. 9/2005)

Senior Advocate Atul Damle, appearing for owner Rahul Arun Merchant (Karta of Chaturbhuj Vallabhdas HUF), argued that the SLAO’s rate was inadequate given the property’s prime location near Ghatkopar Railway Station, M.G. Road, and Rajawadi Hospital. The owner relied on expert evidence and a 2003 Development Agreement for the remaining larger portion of the family’s property (7,935.50 sq.m.) to claim ₹19,368 per sq.m.

The Acquiring Body (Railways) and SLAO defended the original award, citing the land’s narrow width (9-11 metres), access only through a narrow by-lane, railway boundary restrictions under DC Regulation 29(8)(ii), and tenant occupancy.

Justice Farhan P. Dubash held that the SLAO’s valuation was on the lower side and failed to adequately consider locational advantages. However, the owner’s high claim was also excessive. The Court accepted the 2003 Development Agreement as indicative evidence of market trend for the larger holding but applied a substantial ~60% deduction for the acquired strip’s disadvantages (narrow shape, limited access, railway proximity requiring NOC, and encumbrances). This resulted in the enhanced rate of ₹6,200 per sq.m.

The owner and tenants are also entitled to:

• 12% additional amount under Section 23(1-A) from the date of Section 4 notification till possession.
• 30% solatium under Section 23(2).
• Interest under Sections 28 and 34. Amounts already paid under the original award will be adjusted. The SLAO must recalculate and disburse the balance.

Apportionment Decision (LAR No. 5/2003)

The Court rejected the owner’s contention that tenants deserved no share because they received alternate accommodation from MMRDA in 2005. It held that the 12 protected/statutory tenants (under the Bombay Rent Act) had valuable occupancy rights in the structures that existed at the time of the Section 4 notification in 1998. These rights were extinguished by the acquisition and therefore merited compensation.

Final Apportionment:

• Owner (Claimant No. 1): 40% (for land ownership and reversionary interest).
• Tenants (Claimants 2 to 13): 60% (for their protected tenancy rights).

The Court emphasised that apportionment must be based on interests subsisting at the time of acquisition, not subsequent rehabilitation events.

MMRDA’s Claim Dismissed: Although the tenants had executed undertakings in favour of MMRDA for handing over their compensation share, the Court ruled that MMRDA had no independent pre-existing interest in the property. It cannot directly claim the 60% share in this Section 30 reference. MMRDA may pursue separate legal proceedings against the tenants to enforce the undertakings.

Implications

This judgment is important for Mumbai’s infrastructure projects involving railway expansions, metro lines, and redevelopment of old chawls. It strikes a balance by recognising locational value for owners while protecting long-standing tenants’ rights in acquisition compensation. It also clarifies limits on MMRDA’s ability to recover rehabilitation costs directly through land acquisition proceedings.

The parties have been directed to submit fresh calculations within two weeks, after which payments must be processed within four weeks.

Also Read: Bought a Flat, Paid in Full, Now Can’t Sell: Kanakia Hollywood Buyer’s Shocking RERA Rejection

The post Bombay HC Enhances Compensation for Ghatkopar 5th & 6th Railway Line Land to ₹6,200/sqm appeared first on Square Feat India.

In a detailed judgment delivered by Justice Amit Borkar on 10 June 2026 in Writ Petition No. 1736 of 2020 (with connected interim applications), the Court allowed the petition filed by Bagasarwala Property LLP and restored the validity of the sanction granted on 24 May 2018.

Background of the Transaction

The property belongs to a Public Trust (Respondent No. 3). It had a historical lease from 1917 and assignment in 1932. The Trust terminated the previous lessee’s rights via a 2016 notice. In 2018, the Trust obtained Charity Commissioner’s permission to grant a 29-year lease to Bagasarwala Property LLP, along with renewal rights and an option to purchase reversionary rights.

Following sanction, the lease deed was executed on 18 September 2018, the petitioner purchased reversionary rights through a conveyance deed, and a Change Report deleting the property from Trust records was accepted in October 2018.

Heirs of the earlier assignee (Vinod Srikrishna Poddar and Vivek Vinod Poddar) challenged the deal under Section 36(2), alleging suppression of the termination notice, lack of transparency in the advertisement, inadequate valuation, and that the Trust lacked authority due to ongoing tenancy claims.

The Joint Charity Commissioner accepted these pleas in the order dated 29 January 2020, cancelled the sanction, and directed the trustees to refund ₹6.53 crore plus rent and restore the property in Trust records within 180 days.

Court’s Key Reasoning on Section 36(2)

Justice Borkar explained the narrow and restricted scope of revocation powers under Section 36(2) of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act:

• Revocation is not an appellate review of the original sanction. The Charity Commissioner cannot re-examine the wisdom, necessity, valuation, or desirability of a transaction once sanction is granted.
• After execution of the conveyance deed, revocation is permissible only on the ground of fraud practised upon the authority before granting sanction.
• Allegations of fraud must be pleaded with specific particulars and proved with clear evidence. Mere omissions (such as not attaching one termination notice) or deficiencies in advertisement do not constitute fraud when the Commissioner was already aware of disputes, encumbrances, and the “as is where is” condition of the property.
• The original 2018 sanction order showed that the Charity Commissioner had considered pending litigations, earlier leases, structural condition, and valuation by a government-approved valuer.
• Issues of tenancy validity, ownership of structures, and title disputes cannot be adjudicated in Section 36(2) proceedings — they must be decided in appropriate civil or tenancy forums.
• Valuation differences or claims of “haste” do not amount to fraud. The law protects the finality of completed transactions approved under the Act.

The Court held that the 2020 revocation order travelled beyond statutory limits and effectively converted revocation proceedings into a merits review, which is impermissible.

Operative Directions

The High Court:

• Quashed the impugned order dated 29 January 2020.
• Declared that the sanction dated 24 May 2018 continues to remain valid and operative.
• Set aside all directions for refund of money and restoration of the property in Trust records.
• Explicitly clarified that the judgment does not decide any title, tenancy, leasehold rights, ownership of structures, or other civil claims between the parties. All such disputes remain open for adjudication in proper forums.
• Rejected the request for stay of the judgment.
• Made no order as to costs.

Significance for Real Estate & Trusts

This ruling is important for developers, investors, and public trusts dealing with charity properties, cessed buildings, or redevelopment projects in Mumbai. It strengthens legal certainty for transactions that have received prior sanction and reached completion, while limiting the Charity Commissioner’s power to reopen deals without strong evidence of fraud.

The judgment reinforces the protective intent of Section 36 while preventing its misuse as a tool to unsettle concluded deals on grounds of subsequent dissatisfaction or rival claims.

Also Read: Tenant’s New Flat in Redevelopment Taxed?

The post Bombay HC Upholds ₹6.53 Cr Trust Deal: Revocation Only on Proof of Fraud appeared first on Square Feat India.

The judgment came in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai vs Tahir Properties Ltd, decided by Justice Firdosh P. Pooniwalla on June 9, 2026. The dispute involved the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) and Tahir Properties Ltd over a steep increase in property tax after a building was demolished for redevelopment.

Background of the case

The property, located in Worli, Mumbai, originally had a modest rateable value of ₹6,460 per year. After the building was demolished and redevelopment began, MCGM reassessed the land and increased its rateable value to approximately ₹8.99 lakh per year.

Tahir Properties challenged this sharp increase before the Small Causes Court, which ruled in its favour. The lower court held that the rateable value could not exceed the earlier assessment and restored it to ₹6,460.

High Court’s key ruling

The High Court overturned this reasoning and provided crucial clarity on how such properties should be taxed.

It held that when a building is demolished and construction is ongoing, the property must be treated as vacant land for the purpose of taxation. This is because the structure is not complete and cannot be occupied or generate rental value.

However, the Court also made it clear that the earlier tax cannot simply continue.

The previous assessment was based on a developed property with a building. Once the building is demolished, the nature of the property changes, and the valuation must be recalculated accordingly.

Matter sent back for fresh assessment

Instead of fixing a new rateable value, the Court remanded the matter back to MCGM authorities. It directed them to reassess the property by treating it as vacant land and applying the correct legal principles.

This means that while the tax may increase, it must be determined through a proper and legally consistent method.

Relief on water and sewerage charges

The Court also addressed related charges:

• Water Charges: If a water connection exists, the property owner is liable to pay water charges based on consumption. However, water tax and water benefit tax cannot be levied in addition.
• Sewerage Charges: Since the property is an open plot without a constructed building or drainage connection, sewerage charges are not applicable.

Why this ruling matters

This decision is particularly important in a city like Mumbai, where redevelopment projects are widespread. It clarifies a long-standing grey area in property taxation during the transition phase between demolition and completion.

The ruling establishes that redevelopment sites are neither exempt from tax nor liable to be taxed as completed buildings. Instead, they must be assessed as vacant land based on their potential value.

For developers, housing societies, and landowners, the judgment provides much-needed clarity and is likely to influence similar disputes in the future.

Also Read: RERA Not for Redevelopment: Tribunal Warns Housing Society Members

The post Redevelopment Sites Not Tax-Free: Bombay HC Clarifies Property Tax Rules appeared first on Square Feat India.

The judgment, delivered by Justice Gauri Godse in Second Appeal No. 425 of 2003, sets aside concurrent rulings of lower courts that had declared the Thane-based Dev Bappa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. as the owner of the land and directed the original landowner to execute a conveyance deed in its favour.

The Core Dispute

The case centered on a plot of land in Thane on which a residential building had been constructed and occupied by members of the society. While flat purchasers had agreements in place with the developer or landowner, the legal ownership of the land itself remained with the original owner, Waman Narayan Bhave.

The society approached the court seeking a declaration that it was the owner of both the land and the building.

Chronological Background

1977 – Agreement to Sell
An agreement was executed between the landowner and the promoter of the proposed society for sale of the land. However, the transaction was never completed, and only a token amount was paid.

1981 – Suit Filed by Society
The society filed a civil suit seeking a declaration of ownership. Crucially, it did not seek specific performance of the agreement or a direction for conveyance.

1989 – Trial Court Verdict
The trial court ruled in favour of the society, holding that agreements with flat purchasers under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act 1963 (MOFA) entitled the society to ownership. It also directed execution of a conveyance deed.

2002 – Appellate Court Upholds Ruling
The District Court confirmed the decision, relying on MOFA provisions and the occupation of flats by members.

2003 – Second Appeal Filed
The landowner challenged both rulings before the High Court.

June 8, 2026 – High Court Judgment
After prolonged litigation, the High Court overturned both decisions.

Key Legal Findings

The High Court identified multiple legal flaws:

• No Title, No Ownership:
  The society failed to produce any valid title document establishing ownership of the land.
• Flat Agreements ≠ Land Ownership:
  Agreements with individual flat buyers under MOFA do not automatically transfer land ownership to the society.
• Relief Beyond Pleadings Invalid:
  The society had only sought a declaration, yet the lower courts granted conveyance—something never properly claimed.
• Specific Relief Act Violation:
  Under the Specific Relief Act 1963, courts cannot grant a mere declaration when a more substantive relief is available but not sought.
• Abandonment of Conveyance Claim:
  The society had attempted to amend its suit to include a conveyance prayer but later withdrew it. The High Court held that such a claim, once abandoned, cannot be indirectly granted.

Final Order

The High Court:

• Quashed and set aside the judgments of the trial and appellate courts
• Dismissed the original suit filed by the society
• Granted no costs

Why This Matters

This ruling has major implications for housing societies and homebuyers:

• Flat agreements alone do not confer ownership of land
• Societies must obtain conveyance or deemed conveyance to secure title
• Legal drafting and proper relief claims are critical
• Lack of conveyance could impact redevelopment and financing

For thousands of societies in Maharashtra awaiting conveyance, this judgment is a stark reminder: possession and agreements do not equal ownership.

Conclusion

The Bombay High Court’s ruling reinforces a fundamental principle in real estate law—the distinction between contractual rights and legal ownership. Without a valid conveyance, societies cannot claim title to land, regardless of long-term possession or flat sale agreements.

Also Read: Bombay HC: Flat Buyers Win Deemed Conveyance Row

The post Societies Cannot Claim Land Ownership Just Based on Flat Agreements appeared first on Square Feat India.

Justice Amit Borkar, in his order pronounced on 7 May 2026, allowed the writ petition filed by Vishal T. Lathia and other members of the Managing Committee of Nensey Cottage Co-operative Housing Society Ltd, located at Sant Dyaneshwar Marg, Borivali (East). The court set aside the orders passed by the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies (R-North Ward), and the Divisional Joint Registrar, terming the action as a “colourable exercise of power” influenced by external political pressure.

Background of the Dispute

The controversy arose when the society, which had secured 85% member consent for redevelopment and appointed a developer, faced opposition from a section of members. These members, instead of approaching the appropriate forums, routed their grievances through a local Member of Legislative Council (MLC) belonging to the same political party as one of the complainants, Mr. Sudhir Hattangadi.

On 26 August 2025, the MLC wrote to the Deputy Registrar. On the same day, the Deputy Registrar issued a show cause notice. Subsequently, on 27 November 2025, the Deputy Registrar passed an order under Section 75(5) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, disqualifying the managing committee members for two years (later reduced to six months), citing non-submission of Audit Rectification Reports for FY 2022-23 and 2023-24.

Later, on 20 January 2026, an Administrator was appointed under Section 77A(1)(b-1), and one of the complainants was made part of the board. The bank accounts of the society were also frozen.

High Court’s Key Observations

Justice Borkar observed that the petitioners had submitted clear documentary evidence — letters dated 25 September 2023 and 10 September 2024 with official acknowledgements from the Deputy Registrar’s office — proving that the audit rectification reports and accounts were duly submitted. However, both the Deputy Registrar and the Divisional Joint Registrar failed to consider this material and passed orders mechanically.

The court noted that the entire proceedings were triggered by a politically motivated complaint. Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of M.P. vs. Sanjay Nagayach (2013), Justice Borkar held that statutory authorities like the Registrar must function independently and cannot act under external pressure or political influence.

The judge remarked that the “chain of events” — complaint to the MLC, immediate letter from the MLC, and swift action by the Deputy Registrar on the same day — created a strong impression that the authority did not apply its mind independently. The court described this as a colourable exercise of power.

The appointment of the Administrator was also set aside as it was based on the flawed disqualification order. The court further criticised the use of the urgency proviso under Section 77A without recording valid reasons and noted the conflict of interest in appointing a complainant as part of the Administrator board.

Relief Granted and Directions Issued

The High Court passed the following directions:

• All impugned orders dated 27.11.2025, 20.01.2026, and 15.04.2026 stand quashed and set aside.
• The disqualification of the petitioners is cancelled.
• The original Managing Committee stands restored forthwith.
• The Administrator must immediately hand over charge, records, and documents to the restored committee.
• The society’s bank accounts shall be restored to the Managing Committee.

In a significant direction, the court ordered the Secretary, Co-operation Department, to examine the conduct of the Deputy Registrar (who passed the original orders) and the Divisional Joint Registrar. The State Government has been directed to call for their explanations and decide on disciplinary action within three months. A compliance affidavit must be filed in the High Court.

The request for stay of the judgment made by Respondent No. 12 was rejected by the court.

Significance of the Order

This judgment sends a strong message against political interference in the functioning of cooperative housing societies, especially in redevelopment matters. It reiterates that democratically elected bodies cannot be removed casually on the basis of politically motivated complaints without independent application of mind by statutory authorities.

The matter has been listed for compliance on 10 August 2026.

Also Read: Bombay HC Ends 20-Year Battle, Orders Eviction from Prime Bandra Plot

The post Bombay High Court Orders Probe Against Deputy Registrar Over Political Influence in Coop Society appeared first on Square Feat India.

A division bench of Justices A.S. Gadkari and Kamal Khata, in its order dated 8 May 2026 in Criminal Appeal No. 337 of 2026 (Primezone Developers Pvt Ltd vs State of Maharashtra & Ors), set aside the 2020 auction sale of a prime 35-acre residential development land parcel in Assandh, Karnal, Haryana. The property, which was valued at ₹56–74 crore as recently as 2018, was sold for a shockingly low ₹10.09 crore to Rudraveerya Developers Ltd through a process the court described as riddled with “mischief, fraud, and collusion.”

The Backdrop: India’s ₹5,600 Crore NSEL Scam

The NSEL crisis erupted in 2013 when the exchange defaulted on payments to over 13,000 investors, triggering one of India’s largest financial frauds. The Economic Offences Wing (EOW), Mumbai Police, invoked the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (MPID) Act, 1999, to attach assets of defaulters, including those linked to Ranjeev Agarwal, who allegedly diverted ₹31 crore of tainted funds into Primezone Developers.

The Haryana land — part of the proposed “Prime City” and “Prime Residential” projects — was attached in 2014. In February 2018, the MPID Special Court made the attachment absolute. Quiker Realty Ltd, appointed as valuer and auctioneer by the Maharashtra government, was tasked with selling the property to recover funds for duped investors.

How the “Scam Within a Scam” Unfolded

The court’s 73-page judgment meticulously dismantles the auction process:

• Wild Valuation Swing: In May 2018, Quiker valued the land at ₹74.74 crore (freehold) and ₹56 crore (distress sale) using the Discounted Cash Flow method for a plotted residential project. Three auction attempts with a ₹60 crore reserve price failed. Suddenly, in June 2020, the same valuer reclassified the land as “agricultural” and valued it at just ₹10.41 crore on an “as is where is” basis — without any fresh site inspection.
• Misleading Publicity: Auction notices were published only in Chandigarh editions of Punjabi (Ajit) and Hindi (Dainik Jagran) newspapers with negligible circulation in Haryana. Later notices appeared solely on Quiker Realty’s website, for which the court noted there was “no data on viewership.”
• Deliberate Misdescription: The property location shown on the auction website was incorrect. The court observed that even the Competent Authority eventually admitted this “material error” significantly affected the valuation.
• Suspicious Bidding: Two of the four bidders shared a common director (Rajan Goyal). Rudraveerya Developers emerged as the highest bidder at ₹10.09 crore. The court called the entire process “pre-planned” to favour a particular buyer.

Justice Kamal Khata, authoring the judgment, pulled no punches: “The Competent Authority and Quiker Realty Ltd. are equally complicit… This is a scam within the scam.” The bench held that the authorities owed a fiduciary duty to the 13,000+ NSEL victims but instead “defeated the very purpose of conducting an auction.”

Landmark Orders by the High Court

The court has directed:

• Immediate return of the entire ₹10.09 crore paid by Rudraveerya Developers within four weeks.
• Appointment of a new Competent Authority within four weeks.
• Fresh valuation by an independent valuer and a completely transparent re-auction with wide publicity in local newspapers and electronic media.
• Disqualification of Quiker Realty Ltd from government valuations and auctions for at least five years.
• Investigation and action against the erring officials of the Competent Authority.
• The attachment on the property continues pending the fresh auction.

The court also allowed the appeal filed by homebuyers (who had purchased plots worth over ₹7 crore) and noted the legitimate claims of Union Bank of India, which held a mortgage on the property.

What It Means for NSEL Victims

For over a decade, NSEL investors have received only meagre recoveries. The court highlighted that the proposed settlement offers victims just 40% of their principal — a devastating loss when adjusted for time value. “Instead of protecting the defrauded investors, the machinery meant to help them became part of the problem,” the judgment observed.

Legal experts say this verdict could have far-reaching implications for other NSEL asset sales handled by the same agencies.

The Maharashtra government has been directed to file a compliance affidavit within six months.

Also Read: Home Buyers Of HDIL Projects Wary, Post PMC Bank Scam

The post ‘Scam Within a Scam’: Bombay HC Exposes ₹50 Cr Fraud in NSEL Land Auction appeared first on Square Feat India.

the leafy colony of Erandwane in Pune, the retired soldiers of the Pune Ex-servicemen Co-operative Housing Society had spent years trying to protect a patch of green from encroaching slums and wandering cattle. They hired a nursery, built a jogging path with benches, and fenced it in. Then one February morning in 2010, they opened their newspaper and found something far more alarming than slum-dwellers at the gate — it was the Pune Municipal Corporation itself, announcing it was taking their open space. For compensation of exactly one rupee.

That rupee became the symbol of a long and bitter battle. Across Pune, from Walvekar Nagar to Aundh to Parvati, other landowners and plot holders read similar declarations in local newspapers over a span of years stretching back to 2004. A brief public notice. A month to raise objections. And then, possession. Their common spaces — parks, gardens, jogging tracks that they had built and maintained — were being claimed by a civic body invoking Rule 13.3.1.5 of Pune’s Development Control Rules. Five different sets of petitioners, five different layouts, one terrifying rule.

On May 6, 2026, a division bench of the Bombay High Court, comprising Justices Manish Pitale and Shreeram V. Shirsat, put an end to it. Rule 13.3.1.5 was declared unconstitutional. It was struck down.

The Rule That Took Land for a Rupee

Rule 13.3.1.5 of Pune’s Development Control Rules — brought into force on February 5, 1987 — reads, at its core, like a bureaucratic formality. Whenever called upon by the Planning Authority, open spaces in layouts “shall be handed over to the Planning Authority after development of the same for which nominal amount (of ₹1) shall be paid.” It then adds a second limb: if the authority is “convinced that there is misuse of open spaces,” it “shall take over the land.”

No definition of misuse. No notice required before the declaration. No reference to the Land Acquisition Act or to the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act that actually govern acquisition of property. The rule cited only Sections 202 and 203 of the BPMC Act — provisions, the petitioners would argue, that deal exclusively with the vesting of public streets in the corporation, and have nothing whatsoever to do with open spaces.

The Rule in Question — Rule 13.3.1.5

“Whenever called upon by the Planning Authority to do so, under provisions of Section 202, 203 of BPMC Act, areas under roads and open space… shall be handed over to the Planning Authority after development of the same for which nominal amount (of ₹1) shall be paid… in which case the Authority shall take over the land.”

On paper, the PMC positioned this not as acquisition but as management — an exercise of “police powers” for public good. The open spaces are the lungs of the city, the corporation’s lawyers argued. They cannot be permitted to be misused. But what exactly constituted misuse was never written down. And that, the petitioners would argue for two decades, was precisely the problem.

Five Battles, Five Stories

The fights did not begin simultaneously. They accumulated, one newspaper notice at a time, across a decade.

• 1954–73 Layouts sanctioned: All five layouts — in Erandwane, Walvekar Nagar, Parvati, Aundh, and Survey Nos. 89/2–91/2 — were approved by the PMC years before the DC Rules came into force in 1987. Open spaces had been earmarked by the original planners.
• 1987 DC Rules notified: The Development Control Rules, including Rule 13.3.1.5, came into effect on February 5, 1987 — years, sometimes decades, after all five layouts had already been sanctioned.
• 2004 First declaration — Walvekar Nagar: The PMC published a notice declaring intent to take possession of open spaces in the layout developed by the Walvekar family. Petitioners alleged they found a local politician personally supervising the PMC’s move to take possession.
• 2005 Parvati owners file suit: The Gadve family’s layout at Parvati had an active application pending before the PMC for a recreation centre. While awaiting response, the PMC published its takeover notice. Civil suits and a writ petition followed.
• 2006 Aundh declaration: The petitioner in Writ Petition 4433 had planted trees in his layout’s open space. A PMC declaration followed, citing misuse, offering ₹1 compensation.
• 2008–09 The acquisition that wasn’t: In the fifth case, the PMC’s own City Engineer and Special Land Acquisition Officer had initiated formal acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. Then, abruptly, in October 2009, the newspaper declaration appeared instead — at the insistence, petitioners alleged, of a local corporator.
• 2010 Ex-servicemen’s society challenged: Pune Ex-servicemen Co-operative Housing Society, having developed a jogging park with a nursery, received the final notice. Writ Petition 5838 of 2010 was filed. All five petitions were tagged together.
• 2026JudgmentArguments concluded on March 25. The division bench pronounced its judgment on May 6, 2026.

The Fear Behind the Fence

For the ex-servicemen’s society in Erandwane, the trouble had begun not with the PMC but with human geography. The open space designated ‘C’ in their layout abutted a slum. Residents of that settlement had been making attempts to encroach, cattle wandered in, and the open ground was slowly being swallowed. The society had done what responsible residents do: they hired Surabhi Nursery, built a jogging track, placed benches. They created a functioning, maintained green space that their members used every day.

Then came the complaint — someone told the PMC the space was being “misused.” And the PMC agreed, apparently without ever visiting or issuing a notice to the society. The February 2010 declaration in Daily Sakal was their first indication that the corporation was walking in, with one rupee in hand.

“The open spaces are lungs of the city and cannot be permitted to be wasted or misused.”— PMC’s argument before the High Court

In Walvekar Nagar, the battle had a rawer, more political edge. The Walvekar family, owners of open spaces in a 1971-sanctioned layout, sent a legal notice to the PMC after its October 2004 declaration. The next day, they read in the Indian Express that the corporation had already taken possession. When they rushed to the site, they allegedly found a local politician and an influential corporator personally directing PMC officers to take over. The petitioners had to run to the High Court to get even a status quo order.

In the fifth case — Survey Nos. 89/2, 90/2 and 91/2 — the situation was perhaps the most damning. The PMC’s own engineers had concluded that formal acquisition was the appropriate route. A letter dated December 31, 2008, from the City Engineer formally initiated acquisition proceedings. By July 2009, the Special Land Acquisition Officer was processing joint measurement maps. The process was well underway. And then a corporator, according to the petitioners, pushed for the Rule 13.3.1.5 route instead — faster, cheaper, and accompanied by just one rupee.

The Corporations’ Case: Public Good, Not Acquisition

R.M. Pethe, counsel for the PMC, and the Additional Government Pleader appearing for the State, mounted a defence built on two pillars. First, they argued, the right to property is no longer a fundamental right — it is a constitutional right under Article 300A, a less robust protection. Under 300A, a person can be deprived of property “by authority of law,” and the DC Rule, they argued, was exactly that authority.

PMC & State’s Argument

The DC Rule is valid law. The takeover is not acquisition but management of open spaces in exercise of police powers. Property rights under Article 300A are satisfied by any lawful authority. The 2024 Supreme Court judgment in Association of Vasanth Apartments covers this situation.

Petitioners’ Argument

The Rule cites wrong provisions of the BPMC Act. ₹1 is illusory, not compensation. There is no definition of “misuse,” giving the PMC unbridled power. Article 300A still demands just, fair and reasonable treatment. The Supreme Court’s earlier judgments squarely cover and condemn this situation.

Their second pillar was the 2024 Supreme Court ruling in Association of Vasanth Apartments’ Owners v. V. Gopinath, which had upheld a Development Control Rule requiring developers to transfer 10% of project area to planning authorities through a gift deed, without compensation. That, the PMC argued, was its trump card: the Supreme Court had itself blessed such transfers.

The State went further, arguing that the condition of maintaining open spaces was “voluntarily accepted” by developers in exchange for FSI benefits. Since the FSI of the open spaces had already been consumed in the rest of the layout, no separate compensation was due. Token payment of ₹1 was, they said, not only legally sufficient but conceptually appropriate.

The Court’s Verdict: Three Strikes

The High Court was unimpressed. Its reasoning dismantled the defence on three distinct grounds, each independently fatal to Rule 13.3.1.5.

First: The wrong source of power. Sections 202 and 203 of the BPMC Act — the rule’s stated legal foundation — pertain exclusively to the vesting and maintenance of public streets. They appear in Chapter XIV of the Act, which deals only with streets. Open spaces are nowhere mentioned. The Court found that the rule was therefore ultra vires the Act itself; it had bootstrapped a power to acquire open spaces onto provisions that grant no such power. Chapter VIII of the BPMC Act, which specifically deals with acquisition of property, was never invoked.

Court’s Finding — Ultra Vires

“A bare perusal of the above-quoted provisions of the BPMC Act, which are purported source for framing the said Rule, shows that the said provisions have nothing to do with open spaces in sanctioned layouts… There is absolutely no reference to common spaces. Thus, the said Rule is ultra vires the BPMC Act itself.”

Second: Illusory compensation violates Article 300A. The Court drew on a Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011), which had made clear that even under Article 300A, a law depriving a person of property must be just, fair and reasonable. It cannot offer “no compensation” — and while “nil” compensation may be justified in narrow circumstances, the burden lies on the State to demonstrate it. A flat statutory declaration that ₹1 is sufficient, with no reasoning and no process, does not discharge that burden. The Court reaffirmed that the right to property, even as a constitutional right, is a human right that “cannot be casually trampled upon.”

Third: Unbridled, arbitrary power violates Article 14. The term “misuse” appears in the Rule with no definition, no criteria, no procedural safeguard. There was no obligation to issue a prior show cause notice, no requirement to hear the affected parties before a declaration was published, no threshold a civic body had to cross before invoking the Rule. The Court found this a manifest violation of Article 14’s guarantee of non-arbitrariness. It noted pointedly that Rule 13.3.1.3 of the same DC Rules actually permits construction of structures — pavilions, gymnasia — within open spaces, indicating that not all development constitutes misuse. Yet the Rule gave the PMC carte blanche to override even lawful use.

Distinguishing the Vasanth Apartments Judgment

The Court’s handling of the PMC’s trump card — the 2024 Supreme Court ruling in Vasanth Apartments — was surgical. In that case, the Supreme Court had upheld a Development Control Rule requiring transfer of 10% open space through a gift deed. But the Court noted key factual distinctions: that rule had been framed under specific statutory provisions in the parent Act that dealt with development plans and reservations; the transfer was embedded in a comprehensive statutory scheme from the outset; and the developer had executed a voluntary gift deed as part of an explicit condition of development approval.

Here, by contrast, the layouts predated the DC Rules by decades. The rule invoked provisions about streets. And there was nothing voluntary about residents being confronted with a newspaper announcement offering one rupee. The High Court concluded that the Vasanth Apartments judgment not only did not cover the present situation — it actually reinforced why the earlier precedents in Yogendra Pal and Pt. Chet Ram Vashist applied.

“The message must be loud and clear — the rule of law exists in this country even when we interpret a statute which has the blessings of Article 300A.”— Supreme Court, K.T. Plantation v. State of Karnataka (quoted in judgment)

Standing on the Shoulders of Earlier Fights

This was not a battle fought in isolation. The petitioners’ counsel — led by Senior Advocate G.S. Godbole, with Mr. S.S. Kanetkar and Mr. Drupad Patil appearing for the other petitioners — pointed to a consistent thread of judgments from both the Supreme Court and this High Court condemning exactly this kind of rule.

In 1994, the Supreme Court in Yogendra Pal v. Municipality, Bhatinda had demolished the argument that “transferred” was different from “acquired” — holding that using the word transfer was a “euphemism for acquisition,” and that the loss of ownership rights without fair compensation could not be dressed up in different language. In 1995, in Pt. Chet Ram Vashist v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the Court had held that a municipal corporation’s right to manage an open space does not extend to claiming its ownership.

Closer to home, this Court had in 2003 in Vrajlal Jinabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra struck down an identically worded bye-law applicable to municipal councils, on precisely the same grounds. That judgment was followed in 2009, and again in December 2025, when a writ petition challenging a similar rule applicable to Baramati Nagar Parishad was allowed. The Pune petitioners were carrying forward a lineage of civic resistance that had been building for three decades.

What the Judgment Means

The High Court’s order is comprehensive. Rule 13.3.1.5 is declared unconstitutional and struck down. The newspaper declarations issued by the PMC against all five petitioners are quashed. All consequential actions taken in pursuance of those declarations are directed to be “rectified to restore the status as existed prior” to the declarations. The petitioners, the Court held, “are entitled to use the open spaces in accordance with law.”

What the judgment does not do is leave open spaces unprotected. The Court made clear that the PMC retains its general municipal powers to issue notices and take action if structures are erected in violation of the DC Rules. Legitimate misuse can be addressed — but through proper legal processes, with fair notice, proper procedure, and compensation that reflects the real value of the land, not a rupee slipped under the door.

For the ex-servicemen in Erandwane, the Walvekar family, the residents of Parvati, Aundh, and the fifth layout whose internal PMC documents had already called for proper acquisition — the order is a restoration. Their open spaces remain theirs. Their jogging tracks, their planted trees, their fenced gardens — built against the threat of encroachment from one direction and the overreach of the state from another — stand.

The one rupee was never payment. It was always an insult. The High Court has finally said so, in writing.

Also Read: Maharashtra Winds Down Smart City SPVs, Hands Charge to Municipal Commissioners

The post Housing Society’s Epic 16-Year Battle: They Came for Our Land with ₹1. We Said No and Won appeared first on Square Feat India.

Petitioner Roshan Shrikant Tandel approached the court after discovering that while the government had issued Section 4 notification on 24 September 1986 and Section 6 declaration on 14 September 1987 for acquiring land for Navi Mumbai, his specific plot was never included in the compensation award declared on 31 August 1989. The award mentioned the land on page 1 but completely omitted it from the valuation and compensation calculations on page 4. Even the possession receipt (kabjepavti) dated 9 July 1990 did not cover this plot. No compensation was ever paid, and possession was never legally taken.

The State and CIDCO admitted these facts in their reply affidavits. Yet they tried to wriggle out by claiming “computational error,” delay and laches, and offered only old 1894 Act compensation plus some interest and developed plots.

Justice Manish Pitale, writing for the Division Bench (along with Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat), tore apart the respondents’ defence. The court held that because no award was passed for this specific land within two years of the Section 6 declaration, the entire acquisition proceedings lapsed by operation of law under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as far back as 13 September 1989.

The judges rejected CIDCO’s “computational error” argument, noting that unlike previous cases cited by the corporation, here there was zero computation, zero payment, and zero legal possession. The court also dismissed the delay plea, observing that the petitioner was a minor at the time, his mother was an illiterate widow, and the State itself had conceded the factual position.

Relying heavily on Article 300-A of the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kolkata Municipal Corporation vs. Bimal Kumar Shah (2024), the High Court held that no person can be deprived of property except by authority of law. CIDCO’s subsequent demarcation and development of the plot cannot override the petitioner’s constitutional right.

In a decisive order, the court declared that the 1986-87 acquisition for this plot has lapsed. Instead of ordering physical return of the already-developed land (which would cause practical complications), the Bench directed CIDCO and the State to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and complete the process — including determination and payment of compensation — within one year (by 5 May 2027).

This judgment is a massive victory for landowners and sends a clear message: the State and its agencies cannot play fast and loose with private property rights for decades and then hide behind technicalities.

Also Read: CIDCO Homes to Become 10% Cheaper

The post CIDCO Took 280 sq.m Land for Navi Mumbai but “Forgot” Compensation — HC Orders Massive 2013 Act Payout appeared first on Square Feat India.