President Sau. S.S. Sapatnekar dismissed Revision Application No. 23 of 2026 on 7 September 2026. The revision had been filed by Bhandup Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. against an order of Co-operative Court No. 3, Mumbai, dated 26 February 2026. That trial court order had refused to throw out the members’ case at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Appellate Court confirmed the trial court order and directed that the dispute will now be heard on merits. It did not decide whether the allotment itself was legal or illegal.

What the five members objected to

The society, registered in 1961 and located at 36, Parimal, Jaydeep Nagar, Bhandup (East), has 32 members and 32 flats in buildings constructed around 1989 (stilt plus four floors). Redevelopment talks began in 2016. A development agreement was executed on 9 November 2023 with M/s. Majestic City Royale Developers of Chembur.

The members — K.S.S. Nair (D-23), Vilas K. Aphale (D-15), Vijendra Ingle (A-18, through constituted attorney Sanjay P. Badekar), Sanjay P. Badekar (C-5) and Om Prakash M. Rahi (D-31) — filed Dispute No. CC/III/65/2025. They asked the Co-operative Court to set aside two Special General Body Meeting resolutions:

• 8 October 2023
• 22 September 2024

Those resolutions concerned allotment of flats in the new building. The members also sought an injunction against their implementation.

Their core complaint, as recorded in the judgment, was not that the society should not redevelop. It was that the method of allotment was illegal.

They alleged that the 8 October 2023 meeting took an “out of the blue” decision on allotment. The agenda notice issued on 3 October 2023, they said, did not mention allotment of flats. An issue of that importance was therefore brought up without prior circulation.

They further alleged that both resolutions were arbitrary, discriminatory and contrary to the State Government’s guidelines dated 4 July 2019 issued under Section 79A of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. They pointed to clause 1(d) of the development agreement, which they said required the developer — not the society — to carry out allotment.

They also relied on a direction of the Assistant Registrar dated 9 January 2025, asking the society to take cognizance of their complaint and to allot flats as provided in clause 18(11) of the 4 July 2019 directives. The members said the society had not followed that direction. They added that allotment before grant of Occupation Certificate was premature.

In short: the dispute, as framed by the members, was about internal resolutions on who gets which flat, how that decision was taken, and whether government guidelines on redevelopment allotment were followed.

Society’s stand: this is not a Co-op Court matter

After receiving summons, the society applied under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Section 151 CPC to reject the dispute for want of jurisdiction.

Its argument was familiar in redevelopment litigation. Redevelopment, it said, is not the “business” of a co-operative housing society. A challenge to allotment flowing from a development agreement is a contractual dispute. Such a dispute belongs in a civil court or before an arbitrator, not before the Co-operative Court.

The society pointed to an arbitration clause in the 9 November 2023 agreement. It also relied on model bye-law 176(c), which it said sends disputes about non-compliance with a builder-society agreement — especially specific performance — to the civil court.

It cited judgments including Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., Margaret Almeida, Vardhaman Developers and Mohinder Kaur Kochar, and argued that Section 91 of the MCS Act is not attracted when the real grievance is implementation of a redevelopment contract with a third-party developer.

It further submitted that the two resolutions were only procedural steps to implement the development agreement, and that the members were in substance seeking enforcement of clause 1(d). Once rights flow from the agreement, it argued, Section 91 “automatically disappears.”

The society also relied on the Bombay High Court’s observations in the Bhoumik Co-operative Housing Society / Parimal H. Solanki matter: after the 2019 amendment, redevelopment became part of the statutory definition of a housing society, but existing bye-laws continue until they are expressly amended. If a society’s bye-laws do not list redevelopment as an object, that fact cannot be ignored.

Members’ reply on jurisdiction

The members said the application was a delay tactic. They were challenging general body resolutions and the allotment done under those resolutions. Internal management, they argued, is governed by bye-laws. Model bye-laws themselves place “resolutions of the managing committee and general body” and “allotment of flats/plots” within the Co-operative Court’s complaint-redressal framework.

They stressed that the parties are members versus their own society. That, they said, is enough for locus under Section 91. They were not asking for money or refund; they were attacking the legality of resolutions. Consequences flowing from those resolutions could be examined in the same court.

They relied on the Bombay High Court ruling in Eknath Namdev Lashkare v. Pancharatna Properties, where a challenge connected with a development agreement and a general body resolution was held to touch the business and management of the society.

What Section 91 actually requires

The Appellate Court restated the settled two-part test under Section 91 of the MCS Act, drawing from the Bombay High Court’s decision in Baliram Misal v. Saujanya Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (Writ Petition No. 17591 of 2025):

1. The dispute must concern the subject-matters listed in the section.
2. The parties must fall within the categories listed in Section 91(1)(a) to (e).

Both conditions must be met.

Here, the first condition on parties was admitted: the disputants are members; opponent No. 1 is their registered housing society.

The real fight was the second condition — whether the dispute “touches the business of the society.”

Why the Appellate Court kept the case in the Co-op Court

The Court applied another settled rule: on an Order VII Rule 11 application, the court looks only at the plaint (here, the dispute application), not at the society’s defence, not at documents filed by the opponent, and not at a dissected reading of one sentence. The plaint must be read as a whole. The Court relied on Supreme Court principles summarised in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali and Geetha v. Nanjundaswamy.

On that reading, the members had challenged two general body resolutions on allotment. They alleged absence of agenda, arbitrary decision-making and breach of the 79A guidelines. Passing resolutions for management of the society’s affairs, the Court held, is the business of the society. A dispute attacking those resolutions therefore touches the business of the society.

The Court noted that the members had not, in their pleadings, mounted a frontal challenge to the development agreement itself. They had attacked the resolutions and sought reliefs flowing from that challenge. Whether those reliefs will ultimately be granted is a matter for trial. It cannot be decided by throwing the case out at the door.

The Court also recorded a practical rule used in such cases: if even one of the reliefs is within the Co-operative Court’s domain, the court has jurisdiction to try the dispute. Challenge to general body resolutions on flat allotment is such a relief.

The Parimal Solanki / Bhoumik CHS precedent was held inapplicable on facts. That case turned on whether unamended bye-laws could be read as if they already included redevelopment as an object. In the present case, the members had specifically challenged the society’s own resolutions. That, the Court said, was enough.

The Lashkare judgment, relied on by the members, was discussed. The facts were different — there an administrator had executed a development agreement — but the High Court had held that a connected dispute could touch management and business of the society. The Appellate Court used that principle to support maintainability, while noting that here the members had not asked for the development agreement to be declared void.

On that reasoning, the trial court’s refusal to reject the plaint was held legal. There was no illegality or material irregularity. Interference in revision was declined.

What the Court did not decide

This order is only on maintainability.

The Appellate Court has not held that the 8 October 2023 or 22 September 2024 resolutions are illegal. It has not held that allotment must be done by the developer and not the society. It has not held that the 79A circular was breached. It has not granted any injunction.

Those questions remain open before Co-operative Court No. 3, Mumbai. The society can still contest the members’ case on facts and law. The developer remains a party as original opponent No. 2.

No costs were awarded.

Why the ruling matters beyond Bhandup

Redevelopment disputes often stall at the first hearing on a single line of defence: “This is not the business of the society; go to the civil court or to arbitration.”

This judgment draws a line that many managing committees and members will use. A frontal attack on a development agreement, or a pure claim for specific performance against a developer, may still belong elsewhere. But when members attack their society’s own general body resolutions on how flats are allotted in the new building — agenda, process, alleged discrimination, alleged breach of Section 79A directives — the Co-operative Court is not stripped of jurisdiction merely because a developer and a development agreement exist in the background.

For members, the practical effect is access to a specialised forum without first losing years on a preliminary objection. For societies, the practical effect is that a majority resolution on allotment is not immune from scrutiny inside the co-operative court system simply because the project is a redevelopment.

The dispute now goes back for a full hearing on whether those two allotment resolutions were valid.

Also Read: Co-op Court CAN Hear Redevelopment, Till This Document Is Signed

The post Unhappy with allotted flats after redevelopment? Members can sue society in Co-op Court appeared first on Square Feat India.

Justice N.J. Jamadar dismissed four connected writ petitions on 18 September 2026 (reserved on 1 September; uploaded 19 September; 2026:BHC-AS:38237) arising from Everard Co-operative Housing Society Ltd at Everard Nagar, Eastern Express Highway, Sion. The society has about 230 members. The petitions challenged Co-operative Appellate Court orders dated 28 April 2026 that had restored two disputes to Co-operative Court No. III after the trial court had returned them for filing in the civil court.

The High Court refused to interfere. The disputes stay in the Co-operative Court. The Court also left open the society’s right to separately challenge an interim stay granted by the Co-operative Court on 10 April 2024.

What the members had challenged

Two disputes were filed by members including Francis Colaco, Mathew Sunny and Raymond Nogueira against the society, its then Chairman Anthony Irineus Carneiro, Secretary Hayley Maria Misquitta and others.

Dispute CC/III/449/2024 attacked the agenda notice of 22 August 2022 and Resolution No. 3 of the SGBM held on 28 August 2022. That resolution reconfirmed earlier cancellation of a letter of intent and authorised the managing committee to explore redevelopment options. The members said the Secretary had no authority to convene the meeting, mandatory procedure was ignored, members were not given a proper chance to speak, and the resolution was contrary to the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, the Rules and the bye-laws.

Dispute CC/III/92/2024 was sharper on timing. On 25 January 2024 the Divisional Joint Registrar, in a revision against a Section 89-A inquiry, directed status quo on a prayer that the managing committee not take policy decisions. The next day the committee decided to call an emergency SGBM. On 28 January 2024 the general body authorised three members — including Carneiro and Aron Pinto — to take the redevelopment process ahead and to convene further meetings without approaching an Authorised Officer if one was appointed by the Registrar. A later notice of 19 February 2024 sought to put the managing committee in “complete custodianship” of the bidding and evaluation process.

The members said the 28 January meeting was held in the teeth of the Registrar’s order and that the resolutions tried to bypass Section 79-A directives and usurp the general body’s role.

On 10 April 2024 the Co-operative Court stayed implementation of the 28 January 2024 resolutions and restrained further steps on the February agenda, including redevelopment-related action.

Why the trial court sent the case to the civil court

The society and office-bearers applied for rejection/return of the disputes. Their case was simple: redevelopment does not “touch the business of the society” under Section 91 of the MCS Act. A line of Bombay High Court judgments — including Mohinder Kaur Kochar v. Mayfair Housing, Maya Developers v. Rajkumar L. Nagda, Parimal H. Solanki (Bhoumik CHS) and Komal Arvind Vesavkar — has treated redevelopment of an existing building as different from the society’s original construction activity. On that view, only a civil court can try such disputes.

On 17 February 2025 the Co-operative Court accepted that reading. It held that the real dispute was the redevelopment process, that precedent barred the Co-operative Court, and that the plaints must be returned under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC for presentation to the civil court.

What the Appellate Court did

The Co-operative Appellate Court reversed those orders on 28 April 2026. It held that the disputes were between “enumerated persons” under Section 91 — members versus the society and office-bearers — and that the subject matter was the conduct of general meetings and management. It relied on the December 2025 decision in Bank of India Staff Panchsheel Co-operative Housing Society Ltd v. Jitendra Kumar Jani.

The society, Chairman and Secretary then came to the High Court in writ. Interveners Carneiro and Misquitta filed separate petitions. Senior counsel argued that the Appellate Court had read the pleadings formally and missed the “subterfuge”: the members had dressed a redevelopment fight as a meetings case.

What the High Court actually held

Justice Jamadar framed the problem as a choice between two extremes, and rejected both.

First extreme: the moment a resolution mentions redevelopment, the Co-operative Court loses jurisdiction. The Court said that is too broad. Section 91 has a twin test — who the parties are, and what type of dispute it is. Parties here were clearly enumerated persons. The type of challenge, on a meaningful reading of the dispute applications, was to competence to convene, legality of the notice, breach of Rules and bye-laws, and holding a meeting in defiance of a Divisional Joint Registrar status-quo order. That is classic Co-operative Court territory.

Second extreme: members can keep a redevelopment fight in the Co-operative Court forever by attacking only the meeting on technical grounds after a developer is chosen and a Development Agreement is signed. The Court said that is also wrong. Clever drafting that creates an illusion of a meetings dispute, when the real controversy is a concluded redevelopment transaction and third-party rights have intervened, can still be nipped at the threshold.

The deciding facts in this case were stage and nature of relief:

• The challenge was not to the merits of whether the society should redevelop.
• No developer had been finally appointed.
• No Development Agreement had been executed.
• The Co-operative Court had already stayed the impugned resolutions, so there was no immediate risk of conflicting decrees or of a Co-operative Court order becoming meaningless.

Because of that, a declaration on the meetings would still be effective. The Court therefore upheld restoration of both disputes to the Co-operative Court.

How this sits with earlier law

The judgment walks through the Supreme Court ruling in Margret Almeida v. Bombay Catholic Co-operative Housing Society (2012): both the subject matter and the parties must fit Section 91. If either fails, the Co-operative Court cannot try the case.

It accepts the older High Court line that ordinary redevelopment of an ageing building is not, by itself, the “business” of a housing society in the C.F. Marconi / Mohinder Kaur Kochar sense.

It then deals with the 2019 amendment. Chapter XIII-B redefined “housing society” in Section 154B-1(17) to include demolishing existing buildings and reconstructing or using land potential. That can bring reconstruction closer to the society’s object — but Parimal Solanki held that existing bye-laws continue until they are expressly amended (Section 154B-31 saving clause). Whether Everard’s bye-laws now include redevelopment is a mixed question of fact and law. It cannot be decided on a bare reading of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 or Rule 10. That is the same approach taken in Bank of India Staff Panchsheel CHS (19 December 2025).

Baliram Totaram Misal v. Saujanya CHS (27 August 2026), which the society treated as its main authority, was distinguished on facts. In Misal, the society had already selected a PMC and developer and executed a Development Agreement and power of attorney. Members had split the fight: resolutions in the Co-operative Court, DA in the civil court. Following Margret Almeida (especially paragraph 47), the Court there said both challenges must travel together in the civil court. Otherwise one court may uphold the DA while the other strikes down the resolution that authorised it. That anomaly does not arise at Everard because no DA exists yet.

What a Co-operative Court can cover after this order

On the High Court’s reasoning, a Co-operative Court can still try:

• Whether the person who issued the SGBM notice had authority.
• Whether notice period, agenda, quorum and minutes complied with the Act, Rules and bye-laws.
• Whether a meeting was called in breach of a Deputy Registrar / Divisional Joint Registrar interim order (including Section 89-A related status quo).
• Whether a resolution improperly hands the general body’s redevelopment role to a three-member committee or to the managing committee in a manner alleged to violate Section 79-A directives.
• Interim restraints on giving effect to such resolutions, at least while no DA is in place.

Those issues remain “touching the business” of management and meetings under Section 91, even if the agenda heading is “redevelopment”.

Where the Co-operative Court’s reach stops

The order does not say Co-operative Courts can decide redevelopment as a whole.

Once the process has “gained momentum” in the sense used by the Court — developer appointed, Development Agreement and power of attorney executed, third-party rights created — a challenge confined to the enabling resolutions in the Co-operative Court becomes, in the Court’s words, theoretically possible but practically meaningless. The civil court, which alone can set aside or mould relief on the DA, can also examine the validity of the resolutions. Split litigation at that stage is what Margret Almeida and Baliram Misal warn against.

The High Court also did not decide:

• whether the 2022 or 2024 Everard meetings were actually valid;
• whether redevelopment is now an object of this society under its bye-laws;
• who should be the developer;
• any term of a future DA.

Those remain for the Co-operative Court on merits (meetings) or, later, for the civil court (the transaction).

Why the order matters for Mumbai societies

Redevelopment fights in cessed and old co-operative buildings routinely begin as SGBM wars: who signed the notice, whether 79-A process was followed, whether a small group was authorised to “take the process ahead”, whether a Registrar stay was ignored. This judgment tells managing committees they cannot get such disputes thrown out of the Co-operative Court merely by writing “redevelopment” in the agenda — so long as they have not yet locked a developer and a DA.

It also tells dissenting members that the Co-operative Court is not a parallel forum to unwind a signed development deal. After the DA is executed, the safer and cleaner course, on this line of cases, is one civil suit that attacks both the contract and the resolutions that authorised it.

For Everard CHS specifically, the two disputes now go back to Co-operative Court No. III. The April 2024 interim stay stands restored unless separately vacated. The High Court discharged rule and imposed no costs.

Also Read: Co-op Appellate Court: Past Members Can Sue Societies for Refund

The post Co-op Court CAN Hear Redevelopment Matters, Till This Document Is Signed appeared first on Square Feat India.

Justice Sandeep V. Marne dismissed Writ Petition No. 15791 of 2025 on 27 August 2026. The petition was filed by 41 members of Saujanya Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Koparkhairane, Navi Mumbai. The Court upheld earlier orders of the Co-operative Court, Thane (11 March 2025) and the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court (16 September 2025) rejecting their dispute under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code.

What the members were fighting

The society has 69 independent ground-floor structures allotted to members in 1995-96 on a 3,200 sq m plot. Members say the structures are not 30 years old and do not need reconstruction.

The managing committee began the redevelopment process in 2016. Key special general body resolutions followed:

• 9 May 2021 – appointment of Project Management Consultant
• 8 August 2021 – authority to the Redevelopment Committee to select a developer
• 6 March 2022 – appointment of M/s Omkar Planet Buildcon as developer
• 28 May 2023 – further steps in the process

The Development Agreement and Power of Attorney were executed on 16 October 2023.

Members then filed two separate cases:

• Dispute No. CCT 201 of 2024 in the Co-operative Court, Thane, challenging only the four resolutions
• Special Civil Suit No. 145 of 2024 challenging the Development Agreement and Power of Attorney

The society applied for rejection of the co-operative dispute. Both lower courts agreed. The High Court has now confirmed that view.

Why the Co-operative Court cannot hear this case

The High Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Margret Almeida v. Bombay Catholic Co-operative Housing Society (2012).

The logic is practical, not technical.

Once the Development Agreement is signed, the developer has already acquired an interest in the society’s property. Under Section 94(3) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, such a developer cannot be added as a party in the Co-operative Court if that interest was acquired before the dispute was filed. Impleadment is allowed only if the interest arises during the pendency of the dispute.

If the Co-operative Court then declares the resolution illegal, the developer — who is not a party — can ignore that order and rely on the already-signed agreement. Members would still have to go to the Civil Court to attack the title. The Civil Court would then examine the same resolutions all over again.

The High Court also pointed to the contradiction that can arise if the two cases move on different tracks. If the civil suit challenging the Development Agreement is dismissed first, and the Co-operative Court later holds the resolution illegal, members are left with a paper declaration that changes nothing on the ground.

What this means for homebuyers and society members

This is the part that matters for every member facing redevelopment.

1. Do not file two cases after the agreement is signed
Challenging only the resolutions in the Co-operative Court and the Development Agreement in the Civil Court is a wasted route. The High Court has said both must be decided by the same court.

2. The Civil Court can examine the resolutions as well
While deciding a challenge to the Development Agreement and Power of Attorney, the Civil Court can also test whether the general body resolutions were valid. Members do not lose that issue by going to the Civil Court. They gain a forum that can bind the developer.

3. Timing of the agreement decides the forum
In this case the agreement was signed on 16 October 2023. The co-operative dispute was filed in June 2024. Because the developer’s rights already existed, the Co-operative Court could not grant effective relief. Members who act before the agreement is executed may still have a different legal position. Once the paper is signed, the Civil Court is the correct forum.

4. Pleadings on “business of the society” still matter
The High Court also noted that the members’ plaint itself said redevelopment started in 2016 — before the 2019 amendment that added demolition and reconstruction to the definition of a housing society. There was no pleading that redevelopment is an object of this society or that its bye-laws were amended after 2019. Without that foundation, Section 91 jurisdiction was weak in any event.

What members should do now

If your society has already signed a Development Agreement:

• Do not start a fresh co-operative dispute only against the resolutions.
• File a civil suit, or amend the pending civil suit, to challenge both the resolutions and the Development Agreement / Power of Attorney together.
• Keep the developer as a necessary party so any order binds the person who actually holds the development rights.

If the agreement is not yet signed, take legal advice quickly. Some recent High Court orders have treated pre-agreement resolution disputes differently. This judgment is about the stage after execution.

The larger takeaway

Redevelopment fights often fail not because members have no grievance, but because they choose the wrong court after the society has already created third-party rights. This order tells members a simple rule: once the builder deal is signed, one court, one composite challenge, and that court is the Civil Court.

The writ petition was dismissed. The 41 members must now carry the resolution challenge into their pending civil suit if they want both issues decided in one place.

Also Read: Bombay High Court Orders Eviction of Singer Preeti Sagar and Family from Walkeshwar Home After 30-Year Legal Battle

The post Don’t Split Redevelopment Fight: Bombay HC Sends Members to Civil Court appeared first on Square Feat India.

In A.O. No. 13 of 2026, Smt. Jyotshana Viren Desai challenged an order dated December 24, 2025, by the Co-operative Court No. IV, Mumbai, which had rejected her application for interim relief in Dispute No. 21 of 2024.

The Appellate Court, presided over by Dr. Srishty Neelkanth, Member-1, delivered its judgment on August 14, 2026, and held that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable loss warranting interim protection.

Importantly, the order does not finally determine ownership of the disputed flat. Instead, the Court declined to grant interim relief in the proceedings before the Co-operative Court.

Dispute concerns redeveloped flat in Kandivali East

The dispute concerns Flat No. 503 in Ashok Anand Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Ashok Nagar, Cross Road 3, Kandivali East, Mumbai.

Jyotshana Viren Desai was the original disputant and claimed to be a sister-in-law and co-member along with Respondent No. 1, Kirti Narendra Desai. Respondent No. 3, Priti Kirti Desai, is the wife of Kirti Desai, while the society was Respondent No. 2.

According to the appellant, the society’s old building had undergone redevelopment with AAFCON Developers. Following the redevelopment agreement, individual agreements were executed between the builder and members for the proposed replacement flats.

The redeveloped building was completed and possession of the new flat was given in 2012.

The appellant claimed that she had a 50% right, title and interest in Flat No. 503.

Allegation of ₹24.14 lakh redevelopment proceeds

A major component of the dispute concerns money arising from the redevelopment.

The appellant alleged that total redevelopment proceeds of ₹24.14 lakh had been appropriated by Respondent No. 1 without sharing the amount with her.

She also alleged that Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 removed her belongings from Flat No. 503 and denied her ownership rights in the property.

The dispute consequently involved not merely the cooperative society’s administration but also allegations concerning ownership, possession and financial rights between family members.

Woman sought access to the flat and protection of her alleged share

The appellant claimed that she was being deprived of the use and occupation of the flat despite allegedly holding a 50% interest in it.

She further alleged that she had been forced to live in a licensed flat with her two sons.

She sought an order permitting her respectful and unhindered entry and exit to Flat No. 503 and allowing her to use, occupy and peacefully enjoy the property.

She also alleged that Respondent No. 1 was unwilling to appear before the Sub-Registrar to execute the Permanent Alternate Accommodation documentation relating to Flat No. 503.

Several interim reliefs sought before the Co-operative Court

Along with the main dispute, the appellant filed an interim application under Exh. 5.

Among other things, she sought directions requiring Respondent No. 1 to remain present before the Sub-Registrar and execute the necessary documents with the builder.

She also sought recovery of ₹17.54 lakh with interest at 18% until realization.

In addition, she asked for video footage concerning the removal of her belongings from the flat and sought directions allowing her access to the property.

She wanted the society to follow the applicable cooperative procedure while calling or dealing with her as a member.

The appellant further requested that Respondent No. 1 be directed to deposit 50% of her claim in a separate fixed-deposit account in the name of the Court.

She also sought an injunction preventing Respondent No. 1 from creating third-party rights, raising loans against the property or otherwise dealing with what she claimed was her share in Flat No. 503.

Trial Court rejected interim relief

The respondents opposed the interim application.

After considering the pleadings and documents, the Co-operative Court No. IV, Mumbai rejected the application on December 24, 2025.

The appellant then approached the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court through Appeal from Order No. 13 of 2026.

The appeal was presented on February 26, 2026, registered on March 5, 2026, and ultimately decided on August 14, 2026.

Appellate Court questioned jurisdiction of Co-operative Court

The central observation in the Appellate Court’s judgment concerns the nature of the dispute.

The Court noted that the appellant’s case involved allegations against a co-owner and his wife concerning treatment of the appellant, appropriation of redevelopment proceeds and an alleged attempt to remove her name from the title documents.

According to the Appellate Court, the dispute therefore appeared to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court and to fall within the jurisdiction of a Civil Court.

The Court observed that the dispute appeared to be more of a family dispute than a dispute contemplated under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960.

This observation is significant because the mere involvement of a cooperative housing society does not necessarily mean that every dispute concerning a flat automatically falls within the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court.

Ownership and possession issues require trial and evidence

The Appellate Court also made it clear that, at the interim stage, it could not conclusively decide issues concerning possession or dispossession.

The Court held that such questions were matters requiring trial and evidence.

Therefore, the judgment should not be interpreted as a final finding that the appellant had no ownership interest in Flat No. 503.

Equally, the Court did not declare Respondent No. 1 to be the exclusive owner of the flat.

The decision was confined to whether the appellant was entitled to the interim reliefs sought in the present proceedings.

No prima facie case established

The Appellate Court considered the three conventional requirements for granting interim injunctions.

The first was whether the appellant had established a prima facie case.

The Court answered this question in the negative.

The second was whether the balance of convenience favoured the appellant.

Again, the Court answered in the negative.

The third was whether the appellant would suffer irreparable loss if the injunction was not granted.

The Court found that she had also failed to establish this requirement.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellant was not entitled to interim protection.

Court could not direct execution before Sub-Registrar

Another important finding concerned the appellant’s request to compel Respondent No. 1 to appear before the Sub-Registrar and execute the redevelopment-related documents.

The Appellate Court held that such a direction was beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court in the present proceedings.

Thus, the appellant could not obtain such a mandatory direction through the interim application before the Co-operative Court.

CCTV footage request also rejected

The appellant had also sought video footage relating to the removal of her belongings from the flat and their subsequent placement in the common area maintained by the society.

The Appellate Court noted that she had not explained what steps she had taken to obtain the footage from the society in accordance with the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.

The Court therefore did not grant the requested interim direction regarding the footage.

Society’s alleged role also did not change the outcome

The appellant had alleged that the housing society failed to protect her interests and was allegedly acting in concert with Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 while ignoring her rights as a co-owner and member.

However, the Appellate Court did not find these allegations sufficient to justify interim intervention.

The core dispute, in the Court’s view, continued to revolve around the relationship and property rights between the individuals involved.

Appeal dismissed

After considering the record, the Appellate Court concluded that the Trial Court’s order dated December 24, 2025 was legal and correct and did not warrant interference.

The Court answered the issue of whether the Trial Court’s order was in accordance with law in the affirmative, and the question of whether appellate interference was required in the negative.

The final order stated:

A.O. No. 13 of 2026 was dismissed.

The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

What the judgment means for the disputed flat

The immediate consequence is that Jyotshana Viren Desai does not receive the interim protections she had sought through the Co-operative Court proceedings.

She did not obtain an interim order securing her alleged 50% share, preventing Respondent No. 1 from dealing with the property, directing access to the flat, securing the claimed ₹17.54 lakh, obtaining the CCTV footage or compelling execution of redevelopment documents.

However, the judgment is not a final adjudication of title.

The Appellate Court’s principal concern was whether these reliefs could be granted at the interim stage in a dispute which, on its face, involves substantial questions of family property, co-ownership, possession and title.

The Court’s conclusion was that these issues require appropriate adjudication and evidence and that the dispute appeared to fall within the jurisdiction of a Civil Court rather than being a dispute properly determined under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.

Judgment details

Case: A.O. No. 13 of 2026

Appellant: Smt. Jyotshana Viren Desai

Respondents: Kirti Narendra Desai, Secretary, Ashok Anand Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., and Priti Kirti Desai

Original Dispute: Dispute No. 21 of 2024

Impugned Order: December 24, 2025

Court: Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court, Mumbai

Coram: Dr. Srishty Neelkanth, Member-1

Date of Judgment: August 14, 2026

Final Outcome: Appeal dismissed; parties to bear their own costs.

Also Read: Society Must Repair Flat Damage from Terrace Leakage, Rules Mumbai Co-op Court

The post Cooperative Court Can’t Decide Family Property Dispute appeared first on Square Feat India.

Background of the Dispute

The Deccan Gymkhana Co-operative Housing Society is a tenant-ownership housing society. Under this model, the Society owns the land and leases individual plots to members, who in turn own the structures built on them. Plot No. 23, admeasuring 10,302 sq. ft., was originally leased in 1947. Through successive transfers, the leasehold rights and the house constructed on it came to Narayan Pandurang Kale and Sushila (Kusum) Kale.

In 1973 the Kales sold the southern portion of the plot (4,300 sq. ft.) along with a structure of 2,300 sq. ft. to Shriniwas and Indira Bagal without the Society’s permission. The Society challenged the transaction by filing Dispute No. 544 of 1975. The parties settled the matter. Under a reconveyance deed dated 3 July 1976, the Bagals returned the leasehold rights in the land to the Kales but retained ownership of the southern structure and possessory rights (vahiwat) over the 4,300 sq. ft. land. The Society approved the draft arrangement and withdrew its dispute.

Chain of Transactions Creating Dual Rights

In 1985 Manjusha Ogale purchased the leasehold rights in the entire plot from the Kales through a sale deed dated 24 January 1985. The deed expressly recognised the Bagals’ ownership of the southern structure and their possessory rights over the southern land. The Society thereafter executed a lease deed in favour of Manjusha Ogale for the whole of Plot No. 23 on 4 April 1985.

In 1991 the Bagals transferred the southern structure and the associated possessory rights to M/s. Natekar Construction LLP. The Natekars, who are developers by profession, later sought to carry out repairs and additional construction. Their civil suit seeking directions against Dattatray Ogale to sign the plans was dismissed, and the dismissal was upheld in appeal. A second appeal remains pending.

Meanwhile, Manjusha Ogale filed a civil suit in 2003 seeking declarations that she was the sole leasehold owner, that the 1991 transfer to Natekars was void, and for removal of the southern structure. That suit and the subsequent appeal were also dismissed. A second appeal is pending.

Parallel Civil Litigations and Co-operative Dispute

In 2004 Manjusha Ogale filed Dispute No. 47 of 2004 before the Co-operative Court, Pune under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. She sought a declaration that she was the sole leasehold owner of the entire plot and the structures thereon, that the Natekars had acquired no rights, and for possession of the southern portion. The Society was later transposed as a co-disputant and Dattatray Ogale was joined as Disputant No. 3.

The Co-operative Court dismissed the dispute in 2019, primarily on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and also decided against the Ogales on merits. Both Manjusha and Dattatray Ogale filed separate appeals. By a common judgment dated 19 March 2022, the Co-operative Appellate Court partly allowed the appeals. It declared Manjusha Ogale the sole lessee of the entire plot and permanently restrained the Natekars from dealing with the suit property or the leasehold rights without the consent of Manjusha Ogale and the Society. It also restrained them from obstructing her. The claim for possession was rejected.

High Court on Jurisdiction under Section 91

The Natekars challenged the Appellate Court’s order in Writ Petition Nos. 5347 of 2024 and 5354 of 2024. The Ogales filed Writ Petition (Stamp) No. 9683 of 2026 seeking possession.

Justice Marne first examined the question of jurisdiction. He held that the dispute clearly fell within Section 91 of the MCS Act. The subject matter touched the business of the Society because it concerned the identity of the true lessee of Society land and the enforcement of Section 29(2) restrictions on transfer of interest without the Society’s acceptance of membership. On the parties side, the Natekars claimed through past members (Kales through Bagals). The transposition of the Society as a disputant further confirmed jurisdiction. The Court distinguished earlier Division Bench rulings dealing with pure landlord-tenant disputes in tenant-ownership societies and held that the ratio of those cases did not apply here.

Manjusha Ogale Declared Sole Lessee

On merits, the High Court confirmed that Manjusha Ogale is the sole lessee of the entire plot of 10,302 sq. ft. The 1976 reconveyance extinguished any leasehold rights the Bagals had in the land and restored them fully to the Kales. The 1985 sale deed and the subsequent Society lease transferred the complete leasehold interest to Manjusha. Ownership of the southern structure and mere possessory rights over a portion of the land did not create any leasehold interest in favour of the Bagals or the Natekars.

Restraint on Natekars from Dealing with the Plot

The Court upheld the permanent injunction against the Natekars. Even as owners of the southern structure, they have no independent right to redevelop the land, reconstruct the existing building, or put up additional construction without the consent of the lessee and the Society. The covenants in the 1976 reconveyance permitted only necessary alterations and better enjoyment of the existing structure; they could not be read as authorising wholesale redevelopment that would effectively create rights in the land. Any such interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the reconveyance, which was to restore the full leasehold interest to the Kales.

Rejection of Possession Claim

The Ogales’ petition seeking possession of the southern structure was dismissed on two independent grounds. First, there was gross and unexplained delay of nearly four years in challenging the March 2022 Appellate Court order. Second, on merits, the Ogales had purchased the leasehold rights in 1985 with full knowledge of the Bagals’ retained ownership of the southern structure and possessory rights. Their own sale deed expressly recognised those rights. The Bagals (and later the Natekars) had paid valuable consideration for the structure. Moreover, the Ogales’ earlier civil suit seeking similar reliefs, including removal of the structure, had already been dismissed. Section 29(2) assisted on the question of jurisdiction but could not justify ouster in these peculiar facts. The Society itself had not pursued any claim for eviction.

Court’s Observations on Dual Ownership

Justice Marne noted that the arrangement created an incongruous situation in a co-operative housing society: the land is leased to a member while part of the structure is owned by a non-member who can never be admitted to membership. Such dual ownership, the Court observed, is ordinarily undesirable and produces serious difficulties in management. In the present case, however, both sides had knowingly accepted the arrangement. The Natekars took a commercial risk by purchasing only the structure without any leasehold interest in the land. The Ogales took a corresponding risk by buying the lease with full knowledge of the existing rights. Both sides must now live with the consequences.

Final Order

Writ Petition Nos. 5347 of 2024 and 5354 of 2024 filed by the Natekars and Writ Petition (Stamp) No. 9683 of 2026 filed by the Ogales were dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. The practical position that emerges is that Manjusha Ogale remains the sole lessee of the entire land, while the Natekars continue to own and possess the southern house of 2,300 sq. ft. (subject to the pending second appeal), but with a clear fetter that they cannot deal with or redevelop any part of the plot without the consent of the lessee and the Society.

The judgment brings finality to the co-operative proceedings while leaving the pending second appeals in the civil side to take their own course.

Also Read: Developer Sells Half-Built Mumbai Hotel, Then Tries to Blame International Advisor for ₹71 Crore Loss – Bombay High Court Says “No”

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The judgment, delivered on 10 August 2026 by Judge Smt. V. R. Kulkarni in Dispute No. CC/III/230/2021, came nearly five years after the dispute was registered. The court directed Hirji Baugh Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Sewree, to carry out the necessary repairs to Flat No. 92 at its own cost within three months.

Background of the Dispute

Sunil Mahadev Dali, a member of the society, occupies Flat No. 92 on the fourth floor of Sumantinath Apartment. The terrace lies directly above his flat. From 2015 onwards, Dali and other members complained of seepage and leakage of rainwater from the terrace that damaged the ceiling of his flat.

When the society failed to take effective action, Dali approached the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Multiple proceedings followed. The Assistant Registrar issued directions from time to time for terrace repairs and for addressing the consequential damage to the ceiling of Flat No. 92. A structural engineer appointed by the society, Mr. Manoj V. Sathe, inspected the flat. Later orders of the Assistant Registrar, including one dated 18 January 2021, directed the member to approach the Co-operative Court.

Dali then filed the present dispute under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, seeking a direction to the society to repair Flat No. 92 at its cost, or in the alternative, reimbursement of the expenses.

Society’s Defence

The society opposed the dispute on both maintainability and merits. It admitted that complaints had been received and that proceedings had taken place before the Assistant Registrar. It also admitted that directions for terrace repairs were issued and claimed that such repairs were carried out from time to time.

Its core defence was that the leakage and seepage inside Flat No. 92 did not originate from the terrace. According to the society, the work claimed by the member constituted internal repairs for which the member alone is responsible under the applicable bye-laws. The society relied on structural reports, including one obtained from Avon Consulting Engineers, disputed the estimate submitted by the member, and denied any liability either to repair the interior of the flat or to reimburse the amount claimed.

Court’s Findings

The court framed a single principal issue: whether the society is liable to repair Flat No. 92 at its own cost and expenses. It answered the issue in the affirmative.

Key observations of the court include:

• The membership of the disputant and the location of the flat immediately below the terrace were not disputed.
• The disputant’s testimony that the ceiling damage was caused by seepage from the terrace remained unchallenged. The society and its advocate remained absent when the matter was fixed for cross-examination, and an order of no cross-examination was passed. The society also led no oral evidence.
• The society’s written statement itself admitted the history of complaints, the Assistant Registrar’s directions for terrace repairs, the engagement of a structural engineer, and subsequent proceedings. These admissions lent material corroboration to the surrounding circumstances.
• No affirmative evidence was led by the society to establish an independent internal source of leakage inside the flat. A pleading, the court noted, cannot by itself substitute proof of a disputed factual assertion.
• There is a clear distinction between repair of the terrace and repair of the consequential damage already caused to the flat. The society’s claim that terrace repairs were undertaken did not address the unrepaired damage to the ceiling.

Reliance on Bombay High Court Judgment

The court placed significant reliance on the Bombay High Court judgment in M/s. Cosmopolitan-1 (Safal Complex) Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. v. Mr. Rakesh Talwar & Ors. (Writ Petition 10183 of 2018, decided on 2 September 2025).

In that case, the High Court examined Model Bye-law 160(a)(xvii) dealing with repairs and maintenance expenditure attributable to leakage of water through the terrace. The High Court held that once the Model Bye-laws are adopted, they must be followed. Expenses that the bye-laws require the society to bear cannot be shifted to terrace-flat owners merely by a resolution of the general body.

Applying this principle, the Co-operative Court held that consequential damage inside a top-floor flat cannot automatically be classified as the member’s private liability merely because the physical manifestation of the damage is inside the flat. Where the damage is attributable to leakage through the society’s terrace or common portion, responsibility follows the source of the damage.

Operative Directions

The court partly allowed the dispute and passed the following order:

1. It is declared that the opponent Society is liable to bear the responsibility for the repairs to Flat No. 92 necessitated by the damage caused due to seepage/leakage from the terrace/common portion of the Society’s building.
2. The Society is directed to carry out, at its own cost and expenses, such repairs to Flat No. 92 as are necessary to rectify the damage attributable to the said seepage/leakage, within three months from the date of the Award.
3. The claim for reimbursement of the quantified amount of Rs. 1,32,263/- was not granted, as the actual expenditure of that amount was not proved by the evidence on record. An estimate of prospective expenditure cannot be equated with proof of expenditure actually incurred.
4. Parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications

The ruling draws a clear line: societies cannot rely on a general body resolution or a blanket classification of “internal repairs” to shift the cost of damage that originates from the terrace or other common structural portions under their control. The decision is particularly relevant for top-floor flat owners across Mumbai and Maharashtra who frequently face prolonged battles over leakage from terraces.

At the same time, the court was careful not to treat administrative orders of the Assistant Registrar as res judicata and insisted that the factual question of causation must be established on evidence. The refusal to award the quantified monetary claim also underscores that members must prove actual expenditure if they seek reimbursement rather than a direction for repairs.

The judgment, delivered after a delay of nearly five years, once again highlights the long timelines that members face even in relatively straightforward disputes concerning society liability for common-area-related damage.

Also Read: Housing Society Ordered to Pay ₹2 Lakh to Member Over Terrace Leakage

The post Society Must Repair Flat Damage from Terrace Leakage, Rules Mumbai Co-op Court appeared first on Square Feat India.

The dispute, originally filed in 1988, has spanned nearly 38 years and involves Ravikiran Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., situated at Jaywantrao Sawant Road, opposite the railway crossing, Dahisar (West), Mumbai, and M/s. Y.D. Enterprises, the owner of Shop Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground floor of the society building. The shops house Swagat Restaurant and Bar.

Chronological Sequence of Events

• Prior to the registration of the society, M/s. Y.D. Enterprises (then a partnership firm) purchased Shop Nos. 1 and 2 from the builder M/s. Vijaylaxmi Constructions by agreement dated 8 December 1985. The firm obtained the builder’s permission on 18 February 1986 to run a restaurant and beer bar/permit room and commenced business.
• The society was registered on 23 October 1986. The firm’s name appeared as a promoter member (status “Firm”) in the registration proposal submitted on 20 October 1986. Share certificates were later issued in the name of M/s. Y.D. Enterprises.
• On 20 October 1988, the society’s managing committee passed a resolution terminating the tenancy and occupancy rights of the opponent in respect of the shops. The society claimed arrears of ₹15,642.15 as on 30 September 1988, illegal use of open space, nuisance (orchestra, late-night noise, parking, coal bhattis, employees using open spaces for bathing, etc.), and unauthorised constructions (kitchen, RCC roof over duct, water tank, electric pole).
• Shortly thereafter, the society filed Dispute No. CC/IV/1318/1988 (later renumbered CC/III/312/2014) before the Co-operative Court, Mumbai, seeking a declaration that occupancy rights stood terminated, eviction, recovery of dues, injunction against transfer, and mandatory injunction for removal of nuisance and illegal constructions. Initially the dispute was filed only against Shri D.P. Joshi as sole proprietor of M/s. Y.D. Enterprises.
• On 22 September 1992, D.P. Joshi filed a detailed written statement denying membership in his personal capacity, asserting that the firm was the member, that all constructions and the restaurant business pre-dated the society’s registration, that dues had been paid, and that the dispute was not maintainable under Section 91 of the MCS Act.
• On 18 January 1993, the firm was registered as a partnership (Registration No. BA56078) with partners D.P. Joshi, Suraj Shetty and Sunita Shetty. Joshi later claimed retirement on 31 July 1992. A letter dated 3 May 1991 (acknowledged by the society) had already informed the society of the partnership.
• In 2015, after more than 25 years, the society amended the dispute and impleaded M/s. Y.D. Enterprises as Opponent No. 2. Additional written statements were filed reiterating the earlier defences and contending that the 1988 managing committee resolution was void.
• Society led evidence of its then secretary Uday Narayan Sardal (affidavit 20 January 2006) and honorary chairman M.K. Tailor (Exh.39). Cross-examination of the society’s witnesses produced several admissions. Opponents did not lead evidence after the firm was added; their cross-examination of the society’s second witness was closed by order dated 1 November 2019.
• On 12 January 2023, the Co-operative Court No. 3, Mumbai, allowed the dispute. It directed the opponents to hand over vacant possession of the shops within three months, restrained transfer of the premises, ordered payment of ₹15,642.15 plus further dues from 1 October 1988 till possession, and granted related reliefs.
• M/s. Y.D. Enterprises filed Appeal No. 16 of 2025. The appeal was decided on 9 July 2026.

Society’s Case (as pleaded and argued)

The society contended that D.P. Joshi / the firm was a persistent defaulter; that the restaurant caused continuous nuisance to residents (noise, liquor-related quarrels, parking inside premises, smoke from coal bhattis, employees misusing open spaces and toilets); that open space belonging to the society was illegally used as a garden/service area; that unauthorised constructions (kitchen blocking ventilation, RCC roof and water tank over duct, electric pole) had been carried out without permission; and that the managing committee validly terminated occupancy rights by the 20 October 1988 resolution. It claimed the right to seek vacant possession under the MCS Act and bye-laws.

In appeal, the society argued that the appeal was not maintainable, that Seema Sanjeeva Shetty (who claimed to represent the firm) had no locus, that M/s. Y.D. Enterprises was a sole proprietorship of D.P. Joshi (not a partnership), that opponents had admitted illegal constructions, that they failed to examine the builder, and that the trial court order was correctly passed after full opportunity.

Defence of M/s. Y.D. Enterprises / D.P. Joshi

The opponents maintained throughout that:

• The firm (not Joshi personally) was the member and owner of the shops.
• Business and most constructions existed prior to society registration with the builder’s consent; hence no society permission was required.
• All dues had been cleared and the firm was not a defaulter.
• The managing committee had no authority to terminate occupancy rights; expulsion required compliance with Section 35 of the MCS Act read with Rules 28 and 29 (show-cause, general body resolution with 3/4th majority, and Registrar’s approval).
• Allegations of nuisance and illegal construction could not be adjudicated under Section 91 of the MCS Act in the manner claimed.
• There was no landlord-tenant relationship; the society could not seek possession of owned commercial premises.
• The firm was a partnership and partners had not been joined as parties.

Key Findings of the Appellate Court

President Sau. S.S. Sapatnekar framed eight points for determination and answered them as follows:

1. Membership: Disputant failed to prove that D.P. Joshi was the member. The firm’s name appeared in the registration proposal as a “Firm”. Society’s own secretary admitted in cross-examination that M/s. Y.D. Enterprises was the member, share certificates were issued in the firm’s name, and letters were addressed to the firm. Documentary evidence (Register of Firms extract, 1991 letter) established it as a registered partnership. The trial court erred in treating it as a proprietary concern. A partnership firm is not a separate legal entity and must be represented by partners; failure to join partners was a substantial flaw.
2. Arrears: Society’s own secretary admitted on 29 January 2008 that the firm was not in arrears. The claim of ₹15,642.15 as on 30 September 1988 therefore failed.

3 & 4. Illegal construction and nuisance: These issues do not survive under Section 91 of the MCS Act. The Co-operative Court has no jurisdiction to decide the legality of constructions (that lies with civil court/BMC). Even if nuisance existed, the society’s remedy was expulsion under Section 35 after following due procedure, which was never done. The society’s secretary admitted that the firm had never been expelled and remained a member.

5. Right to vacant possession: The entire MCS Act and Rules are silent on any provision enabling a co-operative society to claim vacant possession of a member’s owned premises. There is no lessor-lessee relationship. The trial court treated owners as tenants and granted an eviction decree without any statutory foundation. When specifically asked, the society’s counsel fairly conceded that no such provision exists in the Act or Rules.
6. Recovery of ₹15,642.15: Failed in view of the admission of clearance of dues.
7. Interference: Called for. The trial court judgment was based on wrong assumptions of fact and law and ignored admissions and documents.

The Appellate Court relied on Supreme Court precedents distinguishing partnership firms from proprietary concerns (Ashok Transport Agency, Dogiparthi Venkata Satish, Raghu Laxminarayan) and on the principle that final authority vests in the general body (Section 72), not the managing committee.

Final Order

The appeal was allowed with costs. The judgment and award dated 12 January 2023 of Co-operative Court No. 3, Mumbai, was set aside. The original dispute was dismissed. The trial court was directed to prepare the award accordingly. Record and proceedings were ordered to be sent back immediately.

Legal Significance

The judgment reaffirms that managing committees of co-operative housing societies in Maharashtra do not possess inherent or residual power to evict members or terminate their occupancy rights by resolution. Expulsion under Section 35 remains the only statutory route for extreme cases, and even that requires strict compliance with the Act, Rules and Registrar’s approval. Mere allegations of nuisance, default or unauthorised use, however serious, cannot be converted into an eviction decree under Section 91 when the member owns the premises. Recovery of dues must follow the special mechanism under Section 101 (or the corresponding provision under 154B-29). The decision is a clear reminder that co-operative courts cannot invent remedies not provided by the statute and that societies must operate strictly within the four corners of the MCS Act.

The 38-year litigation finally ends with the restaurant owners retaining possession of their shops.

The post Managing Committee Has No Power to Evict Member: Co-op Court Ends 38-Year Dispute in Favour of Member appeared first on Square Feat India.

The revision application filed by Charkop Sangli Bhavan Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Kandivali (West), Mumbai was dismissed by President Sau. S.S. Sapatnekar on 10 June 2026. The court upheld the 1 July 2025 order of the Co-operative Court No.4, Mumbai rejecting the society’s application under Section 9A of the CPC seeking to frame a preliminary issue of jurisdiction.

Background of the Dispute

Mr. Mahesh Bhimrao Rakte, the original disputant, was a member of the society holding Flat No.302. The society had undertaken additional construction, extension and alteration work in the building and allotted him an extra area of 340 sq.ft. The society levied a total of Rs.13,42,000/- towards the cost of this additional construction and modern amenities.

Mr. Rakte had paid Rs.6,75,000/- till 2011-12. The balance amount of Rs.6,67,000/- became payable at the time of transfer of the flat. In September 2014, when he decided to sell the flat and shift to Pune due to his job, he applied for the society’s NOC. According to his case, the society informed him that it had passed a resolution requiring any member intending to sell to pay back Rs.4,86,000/- plus an additional Rs.1,81,000/- (totalling exactly Rs.6,67,000/-) as a condition for granting NOC. He claimed he paid the amount under constraint to expedite the sale, obtained the NOC, and transferred the flat along with share certificates to Mrs. Gauri Bhagat and Mrs. Prachi Bhagat.

After the transfer, Mr. Rakte filed Dispute No.CC/IV/16/2016 before the Co-operative Court seeking a declaration that the society’s resolution was null and void and for refund of Rs.6,67,000/- along with interest.

Society’s Preliminary Objection on Jurisdiction

During the pendency of the dispute, the society filed an application under Section 9A of the CPC contending that Mr. Rakte had ceased to be a member after transferring his flat and shares. It argued that under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, a past member can file a dispute only by claiming through a present member and must obtain prior authority from the existing members. Since no such authority was obtained from the Bhagat family, the Co-operative Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. The society therefore prayed that a preliminary issue on jurisdiction be framed and the dispute be dismissed at the threshold.

Trial Court and Appellate Court Decisions

The Co-operative Court No.4 rejected the Section 9A application on 1 July 2025, holding that the dispute was maintainable. Aggrieved, the society filed Revision Application No.9 of 2026 before the State Co-operative Appellate Court.

After hearing both sides, the Appellate Court dismissed the revision and confirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the dispute squarely falls under Section 91 of the MCS Act because:

• The cause of action arose while Mr. Rakte was still a member of the society.
• The grievance pertains to alleged financial loss caused by the society in the matter of granting NOC for sale of the flat — an act that forms part of the business of a co-operative housing society.
• The claim for refund is personal to the disputant in respect of amounts paid by him during his membership. The present members (purchasers) have no concern whatsoever with the said amount or the resolution under challenge.

The Appellate Court categorically observed that “by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that disputant requires authorisation from the present members… for filing the dispute.”

Precedents Distinguished

The society had relied upon Bharatiya Bhavan Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. Smt. Krishna H. Bajaj (Writ Petition No.1094/2004, Bombay High Court) and O.N. Bhatnagar vs. Smt. Rukibai Narsingdas (AIR 1982 SC 1097). The Appellate Court distinguished both judgments, noting that the facts were entirely different — one involved a voluntary donation and the other concerned eviction proceedings against a licensee/nominal member. Neither case laid down any proposition that would bar a past member from directly approaching the Co-operative Court in the present circumstances.

Current Status and Implications

The Appellate Court has only decided the preliminary jurisdictional issue. The main dispute on the legality of the society’s resolution and the disputant’s entitlement to refund is still pending adjudication on merits before the Co-operative Court No.4, Mumbai.

This ruling is significant for members of co-operative housing societies across Maharashtra. It clarifies that where a grievance arises during the period of membership — particularly concerning conditions imposed by societies for granting NOCs or transfer of flats — the outgoing member can directly approach the Co-operative Court even after ceasing to be a member. Technical objections regarding locus standi of past members are unlikely to succeed if the dispute touches the business of the society and the claim is personal in nature.

Also Read: Dombivli Housing Society Chairman and Secretary Disqualified for Refusing Documents to Member

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